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Abstract
One reason for the popularity of Craver’s mutual manipulability account of con-
stitutive relevance (MM) is that it seems to make good sense of the experimental
practices and constitutive reasoning in the life sciences. Two recent papers (Baum-
gartner and Gebharter [2016]; Baumgartner and Casini [2017]) propose a theoretical
alternative to (MM) in light of several important conceptual objections. Their al-
ternative approach, the No De-Coupling (NDC) account conceives of constitution as
a dependence relation which, once postulated, provides the best explanation of the
impossibility of breaking the common cause coupling of a macro-level mechanism
and its micro-level components. This entails an abductive view of constitutive infer-
ence. Proponents of the NDC or abductive account recognize that their discussion
leaves open a big question concerning the practical dimension of the notion of con-
stitutive relevance: Is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning
in science in terms of a failure to de-couple, via interlevel experiments, phenomena
from their mechanistic constituents? Focusing on the field of memory and LTP
research, this paper argues that the abductive account provides a more adequate
description of interlevel experiments in neuroscience. We also suggest that the ac-
count highlights some significant practical recommendations of how to interpret the
findings of interlevel experiments.
Keywords: constitution; mechanism; interventionism; abductive inference; inter-level
experiments
∗Philosophy Section, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, University of Copen-
hagen, Karen Blixens Vej 4, 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark
mariaserban.org@gmail.com
†Philosophy Section, Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication, University of Copen-
hagen, Karen Blixens Vej 4, 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark
suneh@hum.ku.dk
1
1 Introduction 2
2 Mutual Manipulability and Constitutive Relevance 4
2.1 Constitutive relevance through an interventionist lens . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Mutual manipulability: A methodological application . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Trouble for the Mutual Manipulability Account 10
4 The Abductive Account of Constitution 12
5 The Abductive Account: A Methodological Application 14
5.1 LTP and memory experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 A comparative summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6 Conclusions 24
1 Introduction
The success of the mechanistic outlook in philosophy of biology is in no small part due
to its capacity to describe and analyze the discovery and reasoning strategies commonly
used in the life sciences. This paper takes issue with the adequacy of one prominent
mechanistic approach that targets constitutive reasoning and the associated experimen-
tal practices of biologists. Craver’s mutual manipulability account (MM) of constitutive
relevance (Craver [2002], [2007b]) has been previously criticized for introducing an inter-
nal tension between an interventionist analysis of causation and the standard non-causal
view of mechanistic constitution (Leuridan [2012]; Fagan [2013]; Schindler [2013]). One
such recent criticism has lead to an alternative approach ‘which allows for treating con-
stitution and causation as two closely related, but still distinct, types of dependencies.’
(Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016], p. 753; see also Baumgartner and Casini [2017])
However, proponents of this alternative view of mechanistic constitution acknowledge
that further philosophical investigation is required to show whether the ensuing account
can guide a faithful reconstruction of constitutive experimentation and reasoning in the
life sciences. We take on this challenge and investigate the implications that the ab-
ductive or No-Decoupling (NDC) theory of mechanistic constitution (Baumgartner and
Casini [2017])1 has for understanding the structure of interlevel mechanistic experiments
and the inferences grounded in them.
1The two names used by Baumgartner and Casini [2017] to designate their alternative to Craver
[2007b] mutual manipulability account capture different, yet related, aspects of their analysis of consti-
tution and constitutive inference. We shall explicate these two features in more detail in sections 4 and
5, but we follow these authors in using both names in the paper.
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Methodological and explanatory considerations always seem to go hand in hand in a
mechanistic framework. To wit, it has been argued that experimental and modelling prac-
tices in the life sciences aim to identify and explore mechanisms underlying particular
biological phenomena, and therefore that biological explanations describe the mecha-
nisms that produce these target phenomena. More specifically, mechanistic explanations
are taken to describe how an organised collection of active mechanistic parts interact with
each other to produce some systemic (macro-level) property or behaviour in a complex
causal system. This standard characterization of mechanistic explanations captures their
dual character: they are causal descriptions that span multiple levels of mechanistic orga-
nization. Some have argued that this points to the possibility of distinguishing two types
of mechanistic explanations being used in biology (Ylikoski [2013]; Fagan [2013], [2015]).
Causal mechanistic explanations describe how some system-level effect is produced by
the organised workings of the micro-level mechanistic parts, whereas constitutive mech-
anistic explanations specify how the macro-level complex causal system is built from its
micro-level active constituent parts. But even those who maintain that the mechanistic
framework covers two distinct types of explanation seem to agree that the discovery or ex-
perimental practices underlying these explanations are the same (Fagan [2015]). That is,
causal relevance experiments and constitutive relevance experiments have a similar struc-
ture and are appropriately analysed in the same conceptual framework. This assumption
is also at the core of Craver’s mutual manipulability (MM) approach to mechanistic
constitution (Craver [2007b]).
Craver’s approach is based on the idea that the interventionist framework, intended
to analyse the structure of causal reasoning and inference in science (Woodward [2003]),
can be extended to characterise interlevel mechanistic experiments and the constitutive
inferences based on such experiments. He claims that ‘[t]he norms of constitutive rele-
vance are implicit in the experimental strategies that neuroscientists [and other scientists]
use to test claims about componency and in the rules by which [they] evaluate instances
of those strategies’ (Craver [2007b], p. 144). In other words, the mutual manipulability
account of constitutive relevance is supposed to offer a descriptively adequate picture
of the interlevel mechanistic experiments carried out in the life sciences. We challenge
the widespread agreement that Craver is right about the structure of interlevel (or con-
stitutive relevance) mechanistic experiments and the type of inferences they are able to
ground.
Our strategy is both critical and constructive. To start with, we pick up on the ob-
jections articulated in two recent papers by Baumgartner and collaborators (Baumgart-
ner and Gebharter [2016]; Baumgartner and Casini [2017]) summarising the conceptual
changes required to build a consistent and empirically serviceable approach to analyze
constitutive reasoning in biology. The positive spin of this criticism is the abductive view
of constitution that conceives of constitution as a sui-generis dependence relation which
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is required to explain the impossibility of experimentally breaking the common cause
coupling of a macro-level mechanism and its micro-level components.
Our main focus in this paper is on the structure of interlevel mechanistic experiments
and the inferences based on them. The plan is this. In section 2 we review the key fea-
tures of the mutual manipulability approach that are meant to establish the distinction
between the relations of constitutive dependence (or relevance) and causal dependence.
Then, in section 3 we use Baumgartner’s and Gebharter’s [2016] critical arguments to
uncover the vulnerabilities of the mutual manipulability account. We introduce the con-
ceptual scaffolding of Baumgartner’s and Casini’s [2017] abductive theory of mechanistic
constitution in section 4, which we then expand in section 5 to sketch an alternative
analysis of interlevel mechanistic experiments and their epistemic roles. As the main case
study we will use an example that has become a locus classicus in the mechanistic liter-
ature, namely the case of LTP and memory experimentation. In doing this, we take on
the challenge of showing how the abductive account can be used to provide an adequate
reconstruction of mechanistic constitutive reasoning in the biological sciences (Baumgart-
ner and Gebharter [2016], p. 753; Baumgartner and Casini [2017], p. 19). More generally,
this methodologically-applied analysis will help to sharpen the distinction between causal
and constitutive experiment-based inferences by clarifying the justificatory structure of
interlevel mechanistic experiments.
2 Mutual Manipulability and Constitutive
Relevance
This section offers a brief summary of Craver’s mutual manipulability (MM) account
of mechanistic constitutive relevance. Although the approach has been the object of
scrutiny for many previous studies, we think that revisiting some of these common places
will facilitate the critical task to follow.2 Our reconstruction also seeks to set on equal
ground the two pillars of Craver’s approach to the problem of constitutive relevance: the
conceptual scaffolding of interventionism and its commitment to descriptive adequacy
with respect to the experimental methodologies of the life sciences.
2.1 Constitutive relevance through an interventionist lens
The primary motivation behind Craver’s account of constitutive relevance is to elaborate
a consistent notion of mechanistic explanation that would also mirror the experimental
2Authors adopting the MM account primarily for its methodological benefits include: Illari and
Williamson [2012]; Kaplan [2012], and Fagan [2013]. On the other hand, Harbecke [2010], [2015]; Leuri-
dan [2012]; Schindler [2013] among others have discussed challenges facing the MM account of constitutive
relevance within a mechanistic framework.
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methodologies of practicing biologists (Craver [2002], [2007a], [2007b]). Although Craver
is an explicit endorser of the ontic view of scientific explanation, it is easier to understand
the mutual manipulability approach to constitutive relevance from a more methodological
or epistemic perspective. So we will adopt this stance throughout the paper.3
According to a widespread consensus, mechanisms are complex causal systems of
multiple components whose activities and interactions are organized across multiple levels
to produce some overall phenomenon (cf. Illari and Williamson [2012]; Fagan [2015]).
Thus, within a mechanistic framework the problem of constitutive relevance is tightly
related to the problem of individuating or demarcating what counts as a mechanistic level.
A mechanistic level is individuated by the entities and activities that are organised so as
to produce a detectable or recognisable phenomenon. This generic definition suggests that
experimental techniques play an important role in distinguishing one mechanistic level
from another. Subsequently they should also figure (or be taken into account) in defining
the criteria for constitutive relevance in a mechanistic framework. (We will return to this
point in section 2.2.)4
Craver characterises the constitution relation linking higher mechanistic levels to lower
ones in terms of four distinctive features.5 Firstly, constitution is a part-whole relation in
the sense that mechanistic constituents at the lower level overlap spatiotemporaly with
the broader mechanism at the higher level they are part of. The second feature restricts
this sense of spatio-temporal congruence. It requires that proper mechanistic components
(or constituents) make a difference, under some appropriate conditions, to the behaviour
of the mechanism as a whole. Thirdly, constitutive dependence is a relation that goes
both ways (from the whole to its mechanistic parts and vice versa). Therefore, some type
of supervenience relation is supposed to hold between any two mechanistic levels. That
is, any change in what counts as the higher mechanistic level must be associated with
some change in at least one of the lower level mechanistic constituents.6 Finally, most
mechanists follow Craver and Bechtel [2007] in claiming that constitution is a distinct
dependence relation than causation. In support of this distinctiveness claim they invoke
the atemporality and the bidirectionality of the constitutive dependence relation.7
This introduction of the core features of constitutive relevance paints a picture of
‘stacked’ or ‘nested’ mechanistic levels. There is talk of higher and lower levels which can
also be substituted conveniently with talk of macro and micro-levels (typically when the
3This will also facilitate our discussion of the arguments presented in Baumgartner and Gebharter
[2016] and Baumgartner and Casini [2017] who take a similar stance.
4A further consequence of focusing on the experimental methodologies used to identify and delimit
mechanistic levels is that one can only settle empirically questions such as: how many mechanistic levels
are there? And, what are the (relevant) constituents of such levels?
5See Craver [2007b] for a detailed discussion of these features.
6Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016], pp. 735-7 offer a more detailed discussion of the supervenience
criterion. See also Harbecke [2014].
7For more details, see Craver [2002]; Craver and Bechtel [2007]; Bechtel [2017]; and for a particularly
poignant critique of the distinction, see Leuridan [2012].
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relationship between only two mechanistic levels is considered). We follow Craver [2007b]
and illustrate these notions by appeal to neuroscientific research on the mechanism of
long-term potentiation (LTP).
LTP is a heavily studied mechanistic model of how information is stored at the cellular-
molecular level in the brain and of how neural change may contribute to spatial learning
and memory. In a mechanistic framework, one can think about the relationship between
spatial memory and the mechanism of LTP in terms of at least three different levels:
the behavioural-organismic level, the electrical-synaptic level and the molecular-kinetic
level.8 The behavioural level is associated with different types of learning and memory
and the conditions under which they are achieved, the electrical synaptic level focuses
on the special properties of the generation and propagation of action potentials, while
the molecular level corresponds to the biochemical properties and reactions of various
neuroreceptors, ions and enzymes. Constitutive relevance relations can be searched for
and established between any two of these mechanistic levels and as we shall see in more
detail in section 5, different types of experiments target these more specific dependence
relations.
How is experimental LTP research to be understood within the MM framework? At
the core of Craver’s approach is the claim that some working spatio-temporal part of
a mechanism is constitutively relevant to the mechanism as a whole if and only if one
can manipulate both the part to bring about a change in the whole and manipulate the
whole so as to produce a change in the part. For example, some acting microlevel entity
(for example, the NMDA receptors generating Ca2+ channels through the membrane)
is constitutively relevant to the macrolevel phenomenon (the macroscopically measured
LTP response) if and only if the former is a spatiotemporal part of the latter and it
is possible to perform one bottom-up and one top-down intervention that will produce
changes that are detectable at the two-levels. MM is meant to provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions for constitution relations: if the acting macrolevel mechanism and its
working spatio-temporal part are mutually manipulable then the latter is constitutively
relevant with respect to the former; if the two levels are not mutually manipulable, then
the constitutive relevance relation does not hold. The notion of manipulation used here
is supposed to reflect closely the experimental practices encountered in the life sciences
and to be operationalisable in the conceptual framework of interventionism (Woodward
[2003]).
MM is best viewed as an extension of interventionism from a theory of causal depen-
dence relations (and causal inference) to a theory that covers both causal and non-causal
constitutive relations. Woodward [2003] analyses causal dependence relations in terms of
8More mechanistic levels can be distinguished empirically, but our discussion of the experimental
methodologies used in LTP research will focus primarily on these 3 levels. For another classification see
Craver [2002], [2007b].
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the notion of intervention which broadly speaking is an idealized experiment that elim-
inates all confounding factors to isolate the relation between two variables: X and Y .
That is, an intervention I on a variable X with respect to another variable Y is a causal
process that guarantees that any change in the value of Y is due to a change in the value
of X. It follows then that X is a cause of Y if and only if the relation between X and
Y is invariant under some intervention on the value of X in the sense that changing the
value of X determines a change in the value of Y . As such, interventions model causal
relevance experiments. The MM account contends that the notion of an intervention can
be used to model interlevel or constitutive relations as well. This is supposed to work by
extending the notion of intervention to cover processes that show both the dependence
of macrolevel variable on the microlevel one and vice versa.
In summary, according to MM, a constitutive relation is established if and only if one
can determine spatio-temporal contiguity between the macro and microlevel variables
and the possibility of two types of interventions, one bottom-up and one top-down which
show the mutual dependence of the value of the macrolevel variable on the microlevel
one and vice versa. Before discussing the conceptual troubles encountered by the MM
approach, we would like to make the methodological pillar of MM even more apparent.
2.2 Mutual manipulability: A methodological application
A prima facie strength of Craver’s approach derives from its empirical adequacy with
respect to scientific practices. That is, the MM approach is taken to provide an accu-
rate and philosophically insightful picture into the experimental methodology by which
mechanistic models are constructed in the life sciences. Since we will later take issue
with this claim, it is worth discussing more explicitly how Craver links this experimental
methodology to the demarcation of mechanistic levels and thus to the MM account of
constitutive relevance.
To this purpose, we focus next on the notion of a mechanistic experiment. In a nut-
shell, to perform a generic mechanistic experiment is ‘to place one or more parts of the
mechanism under the experimenter’s control and to assess from its responses to such
interventions how the experimental results can be used to prune and shape the construc-
tion, evaluation, and revision of mechanism schemas’ (Craver and Darden [2013], p. 299;
see also Craver [2002]). Mechanistic experiments can test either for causal relevance, or
for constitutive relevance or they can be complex combinations of experiments which ad-
dress ‘particular questions’ about candidate entities and activities within a mechanistic
schema. All types of experiments can be analysed in terms of three basic elements: the
experimental model, the intervention technique and the detection technique being used.
We will focus on the difference between causal and componency or interlevel experiments.
Causal relevance experiments ‘provide evidence about what makes a difference to what
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is in a mechanism. Such experiments are used to determine the start or setup conditions
for a mechanism and to establish the active organization among its components, that is,
to establish how something happening at one stage of the mechanism produces, inhibits,
modulates, or otherwise makes a difference to what happens at other stages.’ (Craver
and Darden [2013], p. 315) Interlevel experiments, on the other hand, are designed to
test constitutive relevance and so they ‘are used to answer two related questions. First,
one might ask whether a given part is relevant to a given explanandum phenomenon at a
higher level, that is, to the behaviour of a mechanism as a whole. Second, starting with
a higher-level phenomenon, one might wonder which parts in the system are relevant
to the phenomenon (that is, which parts are components in the mechanism for that
phenomenon).’ (ibid.) 9
Within the class of interlevel experiments, Craver and Darden [2013] further identify
two types of bottom-up experiments, interference experiments and stimulation experi-
ments, and one type of top-down experiments, namely activation experiments. As their
name suggests, bottom-up experiments presuppose that the researcher intervenes on a
component in a mechanism and detects changes in the behaviour of the mechanism as
a whole, whereas in top-down experiments, the intervention is ‘localized’ at the macro-
level (the whole mechanism level) whereas detection targets changes in the activities or
properties of the components of the mechanisms. Craver and Darden [2013] contend that
determining constitutive relevance relations requires both bottom-up and top-down ex-
periments (and even mixed-type experiments) to be performed in the appropriate research
context.10
The link between the previous taxonomy of mechanistic experiments and the MM ap-
proach should be obvious by now. MM says that constitutive relevance relations are con-
clusively established by two types of interventions which allegedly map onto the bottom-
up and top-down types of inter-level experiments used in biological research. Returning
to the LTP example, the two parts of the MM criterion correspond to the conjunction
of top-down experiments that, for instance, record electrical signals in the hippocampus
during learning tasks, and of bottom-up experiments such as synapse saturation and
behavioural pharmacological experiments (see Section 5).
The alignment between the experimental methodology employed in this particular
neurobiological research context and the MM account makes the latter an appealing
9Other quotes suggest that the difference between the methodology of the two types of experiments is
not as big as this classification seems to suggest. For instance, Craver and Darden write that ‘interlevel
experiments [...] are not different in kind from experiments for testing causal relevance, but rather should
be viewed as particular kinds of such experiments’.(Craver and Darden [2013], p. 324
10The epistemic work of these different kinds of experiments is sometimes characterised in terms of the
epistemic notion of robustness, which is typically understood in terms of manipulation or detection of a
phenomenon via multiple theoretically independent routes (Wimsat [1994]). For instance, Craver [2002]
writes that: ‘Interlevel experiments are interesting because they provide different independent paths of
access to a phenomenon that are nonetheless part of the same multilevel theory’. (Craver [2002], p. 95
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Figure 1: Mechanistic representation of interlevel experiments. Adapted from Craver and
Darden [2013], p. 126.
philosophical approach to the problem of constitutive relevance. But is this really enough?
Craver seems to assume that the bottom-up and top-down interlevel experiments are both
necessary and sufficient for establishing constitutive relations between the macro and
micro-level of a target mechanistic phenomenon. In other words, his approach entails
that there is a direct inference from these types of experiments to a conclusion about
LTP being a mechanism for information storage (and memory) at the cellular-molecular
level. Just like conceiving of causal relevance experiments in terms of (ideal) interventions
sheds light on causal inference and causal reasoning in science, just so thinking of inter-
level experiments in terms of the mutual manipulability approach is meant to clarify the
structure of constitutive inferences in mechanistic science.
We turn next to the evaluation of this claim. MM has been repeatedly challenged
on grounds of not drawing a sharp enough boundary between constitution and causation
(Leuridan [2012]), of ruling out the asymmetry of constitutive explanation (Schindler
[2013]), and of falling short both as a normative constraint on constitutive explanations
and as a descriptively adequate analysis of interlevel experiments (Harbecke [2010]). Two
recent papers (Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016] and Baumgartner and Casini [2017])
have proposed a critical approach dealing with the weaknesses of the MM approach.
Their authors have shown that repairing the conceptual scaffolding of MM entails a
different analysis of the structure of constitutive inference and the associated interlevel
experiments. In what follows, we summarise the core of their critical arguments and show
that their alternative analysis of constitutive inference provides a more insightful account
of the experimental methodologies used in LTP and memory research.
9
3 Trouble for the Mutual Manipulability Account
Above we have suggested that embedding the account of constitutive relevance into an
interventionist framework spells trouble for MM. In this section we unpack a forceful
argument articulated in Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016] and partially rehearsed in
Baumgartner and Casini [2017] which analyses the problematic relationship between in-
terventionism and the MM approach to constitutive relevance. We then highlight the
amendments to MM that this criticism entails.
In mounting their argument, Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016] endorse two basic
assumptions of Craver’s approach: (i) the non-causal character of the dependence rela-
tion of constitutive relevance and (ii) the formal definition of a ‘surgical’ intervention
embedded in the double mutual manipulability criterion. The first leg of their argument
assumes that it is possible to make an intervention on the macrolevel variable (let this
be identified by the characteristic macrolevel behaviour ψ) with respect to each of its mi-
crolevel constituents (with characteristic behaviours φi). Given that an intervention is a
cause acting at the level of the macrovariable (ψ), the change produced in the microlevel
variable (φi) can occur on one of two causal pathways: (i) I → ψ → φi or (ii) I → ψ and
I → φ. The first causal pathway is incompatible with the assumption that constitution
is a different type of dependence relation than causation. The second causal pathway is
however at odds with the formal definition of an intervention because it shows that I is
a common cause for the macrolevel and microlevel variables. Ruling out both options
amounts to showing that there is no viable constitution dependence relation as defined
by the MM criterion.
On the second leg of their argument, Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016] propose a
modified version of interventionism. Following Woodward [2015], they extend the notion
of intervention to accommodate supervenience relations. Now I is an intervention∗ vari-
able for X with respect to Y if and only if I causes X, I acts like a switch for all the
other variables that cause X, and any causal pathway from I to Y goes either through
X or through a variable Z on which X supervenes. In addition, I must be statistically
independent of every cause of Y that is neither located on a path through X nor on a path
through variable Z. A further modification guarantees that the effect of the intervention
variable I on X occurs at time t before its effect on variable Y which can be detected at
time t′ > t.
By embedding MM in the modified account of interventionism∗, the common cause
model captured by the causal path (ii) above becomes viable. According to this model,
the intervention variable is a common cause of the macrolevel mechanism and microlevel
constituent entity. This gives rise to a different problem for the MM account of consti-
tutive inference. Recall that according to MM, for the microlevel acting entity φi to be
a constituent of the macrolevel mechanism ψ, there must be an intervention I that by
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Figure 2: Representation of common-causal and constitutive models of mechanistic phe-
nomena. Adapted from Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016], p. 750.
changing the value of ψ would also change the value of φi and there must also be an
intervention on φi with respect to ψ that would change the value of the latter in virtue of
changing the value of the former. Consider the first type of intervention which arguably
models top-down experiments. The variable Iψ is a cause of the macrolevel mechanism
ψ and a cause of the microlevel working entity φi. Even if this does not entail that there
must be an interlevel causal dependence relation (option blocked by modifying the defi-
nition of an intervention), MM is not able to guarantee a direct inference about φi being
a constituent of the macrolevel mechanism ψ. The data produced by the top-down ma-
nipulation cannot be informative about the relationship between the variables ψ and φi.
In other words, the non-surgical, fat-handed intervention can generate only confounded
data because Iψ is a common cause for the two target variables.
With the modifications entailed by interventionism∗, Craver’s MM criterion cannot
be used to distinguish empirically between a common-cause model and a constitutive
model of mechanistic phenomena. That is, interlevel experiments do not rule in favour
of the constitutive model (a) and against the common cause model (b). This entails a
systematic underdetermination of the inference about the putative constitutive depen-
dence relation between ψ and φi. Assuming that the micro and macrolevels are coupled
via common causes which no interlevel experiment will be able to break leads to a dif-
ferent account of constitutive inference than the one implied by Craver’s account. This
insight is further elaborated in Baumgartner’s and Casini’s [2017] abductive account of
constitutive relevance to which we turn next.
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4 The Abductive Account of Constitution
The criticism of MM sketched above implies that interlevel experiments are not quite
what they seem at first. That is, contra Craver, Baumgartner and collaborators (Baum-
gartner and Gebharter [2016]; Baumgartner and Casini [2017]) claim that no amount of
bottom-up or top-down mechanistic experiments would be able to establish directly and
conclusively that a microlevel working entity is constitutively relevant for a macrolevel
mechanism (phenomenon). Instead they propose that such experiments provide at best
indirect evidence for the existence of constitutive relevance relations.11
According to Baumgartner and Casini [2017], interlevel experiments reveal correla-
tions holding between the values of the macrolevel and microlevel variables. They do
so by manipulating simultaneously different mechanistic levels, on different causal paths.
Conceived as fat-handed, non-surgical interventions∗, top-down and bottom-up manipu-
lations cannot break the inextricable coupling between phenomena and their mechanistic
constituents. That is they cannot de-couple macrolevel mechanisms from their microlevel
constituents.
As pointed out above, the evidence made available by fat-handed interventions is
compatible with both a constitutive and a common cause model of the target mechanis-
tic phenomenon. Comparing common cause models and constitutive models can reveal
two facts. First, that interlevel experiments cannot be used to distinguish empirically
the two models of mechanistic phenomena. And, second that the constitutive model is
explanatorily superior to the common cause model because: ‘[it] not only reproduces the
empirical correlations but also explains why the common-cause coupling of ψ and φ is
not broken’. (Baumgartner and Casini [2017], p. 14)
The systematic failure of fat-handed interventions to de-couple macrolevel mechanisms
from their microlevel constituents is what provides the indirect evidence for constitutive
relevance relations. The resilient coupling of different mechanistic levels can be explained
only by postulating that there is a sui-generis (non-causal) dependence relation connect-
ing them. On the other hand, Baumgartner and Casini [2017] claim that experimental
manipulations can be used to discover any surgical causes at macrolevel ψ which do not
count as causes at the microlevel φ. Such manipulations would determine conclusively
that there is no common-cause coupling between the two mechanistic levels. However,
they insist that no amount of experimentation would be able to establish that a partic-
11The notion of indirect evidence used by Baumgartner and Casini [2017] is relatively different from
that discussed in other philosophical debates. Given theory T which entails hypotheses H1 and H2,
evidence e for H2 indirectly supports H1 for which there is (yet) no evidence available (Laudan and
Leplin [1991]; Okasha [2002]; Werndl [2013]). In the case at hand, H1 and H2 would correspond to the
constitutive and common cause model, respectively. As we emphasize above, according to Baumgartner
and Casini [2017] neuroscientific experimentation cannot provide direct evidence for H1, but systematic
failures of interlevel experiments count as indirect evidence for H1 which, unlike H2, has the benefit
of being able to explain the impossibility of the breaking the common cause coupling between the
mechanistic macro- and microlevel, respectively.
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ular microlevel mechanistic element φi is not constitutively relevant for the macrolevel
phenomenon. In other words, constitutive irrelevance of particular mechanistic micro-
constituents can also be established only abductively.12
This twofold consequence is at odds with Craver’s original MM approach, for Baum-
gartner and Casini maintain that interlevel experiments can be used only to falsify con-
clusively the common-cause coupling between different mechanistic levels. Constitutive
dependence (or independence) for them is entirely a matter of abductive inference. After
performing multiple bottom-up and top-down experiments which show that two specific
levels are inextricably connected (or coupled) via common causes can researchers infer
abductively that the working entities at the lower mechanistic level are constitutively
relevant for the higher level or for the phenomenon of interest.
If Craver’s MM approach makes causal (relevance) inferences very similar to constitu-
tive (relevance) inferences, Baumgartner’s and Casini’s alternative seems to do a better
job at distinguishing the two types of inferences. They propose that ‘[t]he inference
to constitution is inherently abductive: constitutional models are preferable over pure
causal models because they explain both the highly correlated behaviour of phenomena
and their constituents as well as the impossibility to de-couple them.’ (Baumgartner and
Casini [2017], p.15)
There are some striking differences in the pictures that the mutual manipulability
and the abductive account paint of the purported constitutive experiments performed
in neuroscience. Craver’s MM account entails that the existence of an appropriate pair
of top-down and bottom-up experiments can license constitutive inferences (to the ef-
fect that some microlevel working entities are constitutively relevant for some macrolevel
mechanism). Baumgartner and Casini [2017] on the other hand contend that constitu-
tive relevance relations can be conclusively established only after all possible interventions
(both top-down and bottom-up) have been performed. Or, since such an experimental
exploration of the space of all possible interventions is pragmatically impossible, constitu-
tive inferences are at best supported abductively by experiments which fail to de-couple
the mechanistic macrolevel from the microlevel.13
Establishing constitutive relations requires an extended test series exploring
the whole space of possible ways of breaking the coupling of macro and micro
levels. Only if these tests are unsuccessful, an inference to constitution is
warranted. And since the evidence for the unbreakability of common cause
couplings is never conclusive, constitution can only be inductively corrobo-
rated. (Baumgartner and Casini [2017], p. 18).
12’Overall, as to NDC, every constitutional inference – be it to constitution or to non-constitution –
inevitably involves an inductive leap.’(Baumgartner and Casini [2017], p. 18)
13This further suggests a stronger asymmetry between constitution and causation concerning the type
of underdetermination associated with establishing/verifying each type of relation.
13
Granting the internal consistency of the abductive (or non-decoupling) account, ‘[a]n
obvious question remains: is it possible to faithfully reconstruct constitutional reasoning
in science in terms of NDC?’14 This methodological test will not only vindicate NDC (or
abductive) account as an alternative analysis of constitutive relevance but it will also
help advance a number of questions in the philosophy of experimentation such as: Do
causal and interlevel mechanistic experiments support different kinds of inferences? What
types of evidence do mechanistic experiments provide? What is the relationship between
explanation and confirmation in mechanistic research?
5 The Abductive Account: A Methodological
Application
In this section we discuss the methodology of interlevel experiments in the framework
of the abductive account. As a test case study15, we first introduce some paradigmatic
experiments from LTP and memory research and then we apply the key ideas of the
abductive account to clarify the structure and outputs of these experiments.
The analysis of interlevel experiments from the contemporary neurobiology of learning
and memory is crucial for Craver’s account of the mosaic unity of neuroscience. That
is, the MM account is supposed to yield insight on how multiple explanatory projects
associated with different neurobiological experiments are integrated into more complete
mechanistic explanations of target macrolevel phenomena. This view of the integrative
unity of neuroscience has been challenged. Sullivan [2009] has questioned its descriptive
adequacy with respect to the current experimental practices of neuroscience, while Levy
[2016] has challenged its strength as a normative ideal for the field as a whole.
The abductive account seems to avoid these objections. First, the account does not
imply that all experiments from LTP and memory research converge on their aim of
building constitutive models or supporting constitutive inferences. In fact, an abductive
view of constitutive reasoning in neuroscience is consistent with the idea that the majority
of experiments carried out in this area of research are causal (or at least have a causal
component). Second, instead of directly supporting a global integrative or reductive
14See also Baumgartner and Gebharter [2016], p.22.
15The philosophical analysis of the experiments carried out in the neurobiology of learning and memory
can be seen as a ’hard’ case study in the sense of Scholl and Raz [2016]. The existence of several conceptual
frameworks (Craver [2007b]; Sullivan [2010]; Craver and Darden [2013]; Harbecke [2010]; Harbecke [2015];
Harbecke [2015b]; Gebharter [2017]) for analysing the structure and implications of these experiments
testifies to their relevance for understanding the broader experimental landscape of neurobiology. Our
aim is to show that the abductive account provides an insightful analysis of this case study which has
some novel implications that distinguish it from the other accounts. However, we don’t claim that
the abductive account will be the final word on the structure of experimentation in neuroscience. The
categories introduced by the abductive account to analyse this case study must be further put to the
test in discussing other experimental practices.
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view of interlevel experiments, the abductive account is compatible with there being a
multiplicity of experimental protocols which are tied to distinct explanatory goals pursued
in the cognitive neurobiology of learning and memory (cf. Sullivan [2009]).
More specifically, the account predicts that interlevel experiments aim and consis-
tently fail to break the common-cause coupling of macrolevel phenomena and their mi-
crolevel parts. Such consistent failures show not only that the correlations between the
macrolevel and the microlevel phenomena are stable, but also that they are necessary.
That is, they indirectly show that microlevel property or behaviour is necessary for the
target macrolevel property or behaviour. While the abductive view remains silent with
respect to the metaphysical distinction between constitutive and causal dependence re-
lations, it manages to draw a sharper methodological distinction between the central
characteristics and implications of purported constitutive and causal mechanistic experi-
ments. In particular, it implies that the underdetermination problems facing constitutive
experiments are different from those encountered in the case of causal experiments.
5.1 LTP and memory experiments
LTP is operationally defined as the abrupt and sustained increase in the efficiency of
synaptic transmission following high-frequency (tetanic) stimulation of afferent fibers.
The LTP response is almost always measured macroscopically across populations of
synaptic contact. Macroscopic recordings are thought to track the microscopic LTP
mechanisms which are the putative cellular information storage or memory mechanisms.
Microscopic LTP involves the activation of NMDA receptors and of other types of gluta-
matergic receptors, intracellular Ca2+ and lipid cascades, retrogade messages, and other
components, whose activities and interactions result in metabolic and morphologic al-
terations in the pre-synaptic and post-synaptic neurons. Some of the characteristics of
microscopic LTP, including its rapid induction, persistence, and correlation with natu-
ral brain rhythms, have been taken to suggest a connection between microscopic LTP
mechanisms and memory storage or learning.16
Different experimental methodologies are used to determine how LTP is related to the
behavioural phenomena of spatial (and non-spatial) learning and memory. LTP was first
detected in vivo in the hippocampus, a neural structure known to be activated during
spatial learning and memory.17 Initial recordings of the electrical properties of this type
16As numerous reviews of the LTP literature reveal, there is quite some variation of theoretical per-
spectives concerning the higher level phenomenon that microscopic LTP is supposed to explain (Shors
and Matzel [1997]; Holscher [2001]; Granger and Nicoll [2014]). The most prominent candidates are
memory, cellular information storage, and learning. In the rest of the section we will focus on exper-
imental research which links microscopic and macroscopic LTP to memory and/or learning. See also
Sullivan [2010].
17For complementary historical perspectives on how LTP research came to be linked to learning and
memory, see Holscher [2001]; Craver [2003]; Andersen et al. [2006].
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of the main elements of LTP induction in a hip-
pocampal neuron. Strong repetitive stimulation of the input to a hippocampal neuron
can activate AMPA and NMDA receptors. The opening of the NMDA channel allows
Ca2+ entry, which activates a particular protein kinase (CaM). The activation persists
after the synaptic events that trigger it, and appears to be both necessary and sufficient
for LTP induction in some neurons. The next series of steps that lead to the expression of
LTP is still a matter of debate (Sanes and Lichtman [1999]; Granger and Nicoll [2014]).
of synaptic transmission were made by placing electrodes into two neural regions of the
rabbit’s brain: the perforant path and the dentate gyrus. Although these experiments
allowed researchers to keep the brain intact as much as possible, there is a limit to the
level of detail these detection devices can have access to. This led to the development of
a series of more refined in vitro experimental methodologies which could yield informa-
tion about the cellular and molecular elements involved in microscopic LTP. Although
the hippocampal slice technique opens up experimental possibilities not available for in
vivo preparations, the in vitro preparation requires cutting many of the existing neural
connections.18
The mechanistic experiments carried out in LTP research yield information that is
relevant for both causal and constitutive model-based inferences about the structure of the
LTP response and its link to macrolevel behavioural phenomena of learning and memory.
Offering a tidy classification of the variety of LTP experiments carried out in different
laboratories and research centers goes beyond the more modest aims of this paper. While
such a classification would further clarify the scope and limits of the applicability of
the abductive account of constitutive inference, we hope that the selective sample of
experiments discussed below would provide a clear enough illustration of the power of
the account under scrutiny.
18This is just one among the many methodological challenges that make inferences from the in vitro
experimental results to the relation between LTP and the hippocampus’ function in memory so difficult
to draw. For a more detailed discussion of the factors affecting the reliability of in vitro LTP experiments,
see Shors and Matzel [1997]; Holscher [2001].
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More specifically, we focus on those LTP experiments that seem to target consti-
tutive relevance relations in the following methodological sense.19 They are interlevel
experiments that involve either (i) experimental manipulations of the mechanism of LTP
which are expected to bring about changes in behavioural phenomena such as mem-
ory formation or learning, or (ii) experimental manipulations of macrolevel behavioural
phenomena which should determine changes in the LTP response. The first type of ex-
periments correspond in the mechanistic taxonomy to bottom-up inter-level experiments
whereas the second type qualifies as top-down inter-level experiments. Although for the
purpose of testing the abductive account, analyzing the latter type of experiments would
be more informative, there is a surprising scarcity of experiments that use behavioural
manipulations of memory or learning tasks to study the properties of LTP (cf. Shors
and Matzel [1997]; Holscher [2001]). We also aim to show that bottom-up experiments,
far from being conclusive in establishing a necessary link between LTP and memory, are
often supplemented by analogical inferences (based on the similarity of properties such as
rapid induction, stimulus specificity, associativity and endurance, observed in the lower
and higher level phenomena, cf. Gallistel [1995]; Dudai [1995]; Craver [2003]; Gallistel
and Matzel [2013]; Trettenbrein [2016]). We take the latter inferential strategy to be
compatible, if not directly predicted by the abductive account of constitutive inference.
Most LTP experiments involve the measurement of the excitatory postsynaptic re-
sponse (EPSP) produced by the electrical stimulation of a neuron. ESPSs can track
single neuron or whole neural populations responses.20 A reliable way for inducing LTP
in vivo as well as in vitro is high-frequency stimulation (HFS) which consists of trains
of several hundred pulses of an intensity of 100 to 400 Hz. We briefly introduce next
some of the most common types of experiments in which HFS is used to induce LTP and
investigate its relation to learning and memory.
One of the first experimental methodologies used to study how LTP might be involved
in memory and learning consists in recording ESPSs from learning animals and tracking
whether the response changes after the learning experience. On the proposed classification
of mechanistic experiments, this type of manipulation counts as a top-down experiment.
The intervention applied on this experimental system is at the macrolevel of the rat’s
behaviour of exploring a new environment (traditionally a Morris water maze21), while
the primary detection device targets the microlevel of the electrophysiological response
of the neural cells in the dentate gyrus or CA1 region of the rat’s brain.
It is worth noting that the experimental protocol per se does not rule out the pos-
19This reassertion of the methodological stance is in line with our neutrality on the question of whether
constitution and causal dependence relations are metaphysically distinct or not.
20It is also possible to measure population spikes which correspond to summed action potentials of
neurons rather than membrane potentials. Since the experiments cited below do not apply this technique,
we will not analyze it in more detail. For further references, see Holscher [2001]
21For more details on the battery of experimental protocols involving the Morris water maze, see
Vorhees and Williams [2006] and Sullivan [2010].
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sibility that the macrolevel intervention is a common cause for both the behavioural
phenomenon of learning (a spatial task) and for the recorded LTP response. This implies
that the correlation established via this kind of top-down experiment can be equally well
accommodated by a common-cause and a constitutive model, as suggested by Baumgart-
ner and Casini [2017]. The choice between the two models is underdetermined by the
available evidence. The abductive view predicts that (1) only further experimentation
which would systematically fail to de-couple LTP and behavioural phenomena can guar-
antee a constitutive inference showing that LTP is a component part of the molecular
mechanism for memory; while (2) manipulations which de-couple the two levels would
support the inference that LTP is not a component (constitutive part) of a memory
mechanism.
Are these predictions confirmed by contemporary neurobiological experimental prac-
tices? On the one hand, critics of the synaptic mechanisms theory of memory (Shors
and Matzel [1997]; Gallistel and Matzel [2013]; Gallistel and Balsam [2014]; Trettenbrein
[2016]) point out that evidence from top-down behavioural experiments does not support
the hypothesis that induction of LTP is either a necessary or sufficient condition for the
storage of memories. On the other hand, there are still strands of LTP research that con-
tinue to investigate the link between microscopic LTP and cellular information storage
as a form of memory. These experiments can be interpreted in line with the abductive
account. Namely, as systematic attempts to break the common coupling between the
macrolevel behavioural phenomena (for instance, spatial learning, navigation in specific
types of mazes, conditioned suppression of activity, formation of spatial or olfactory mem-
ories) and microlevel elements of the postsynaptic mechanism for LTP (such as the role
of CaM kinase or of tyrosine kinase in hippocampal LTP).
As an example from the latter category, we draw attention to experiments that explic-
itly investigate correlations between modulators of hippocampal LTP and memory (Shors
and Matzel [1997]). What is interesting about these experiments is that they start off by
acknowledging the common cause coupling between the two levels. For instance, chronic
lead and alcohol consumption are known to impair memory storage and inhibit the in-
duction of LTP. But inferring from behavioural manipulations that these compounds are
detrimental to learning or memory as a result of their effect on hippocampal LTP is un-
warranted. The hypothesis is underdetermined by the existence of other well-established
mechanisms via which these substances influence memory storage capacities. For exam-
ple, alcohol causes membrane fluidization and depresses both excitatory and inhibitory
synaptic activity which eventually leads to disruption of normal function in the cerebral
cortex. All or any of these effects could disrupt the information processing necessary
for memory formation. Establishing that alcohol disruption of LTP blocks memory for-
mation requires showing that the correlation between the two cannot be broken while
varying all the other common cause processes via which alcohol might disrupt learning
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and memory formation.
The correlation between LTP and higher level behavioural phenomena has also been
studied using non-spatial learning paradigms, such as olfactory discrimination. For the
rat, olfaction is a primary sensory modality, with olfactory information being partly pro-
cessed by the hippocampal formation. Several types of experimental manipulations have
revealed stable correlations between hippocampal LTP and olfactory learning (Shors and
Matzel [1997]; Holscher [2001]). For example, using tetanic stimulation of the lateral
olfactory tract as a discriminative cue, evoked responses in the piriform cortex were
potentiated in the animals that learned the target discrimination.22 Furthermore, the
cellular activity recorded in the same region during learning had a similar pattern to the
tetanic stimulation used for the discrimination. Still, these experiments fail to be con-
clusive with regards to the constitutive relevance of LTP for memory formation. First,
the correlations have been shown to be stable only for the olfactory system, so it is not
likely that additional experimentation can establish that hippocampal LTP is necessary
for memory processes in general. Second, the type of stimulation used in these exper-
iments has been shown to induce LTP in the hippocampus even in animals that don’t
learn the target behaviour. According to the abductive account, the latter type of results
challenge the conclusion that hippocampal LTP is constitutively relevant for memory for-
mation because they seem to break the common cause coupling between the behavioural
and the cellular level.
The top-down experiments sketched so far fail to establish conclusively the necessity
of LTP for memory formation or learning. Even when stable correlations between hip-
pocampal LTP and behaviour are discovered, experimental investigations fail to break
the common cause coupling of the behavioural and cellular levels. The relatively small
number of behavioural manipulations investigating the link between memory and LTP
does not entail that it is a well-established fact that LTP is ‘the memory mechanism’, and
that further experimentation is not required. As we suggested above, growing skepticism
in the scientific community concerning the link between LTP and memory formation or
learning seems to be based on experiments that decouple the two. However, one need
not endorse the demise of the LTP hypothesis for memory to show that the abductive
account provides a plausible reconstruction of top-down experiments in LTP and memory
research. Unlike the MM account, the abductive account accommodates a wider variety
of experimental practices, echoing the demand of some scientists for more behavioural
manipulations investigating purported correlations between the macrolevel behaviours
of memory formation and learning and the cellular and molecular mechanisms of LTP.
The account also predicts that ‘crucial’ experiments, if any, will be considered those that
manage to break the common cause coupling thus showing that LTP is not a constituent
22Animals that were exposed to the simulation in a behaviourally irrelevant task did not learn nor did
exhibit LTP.
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of memory.
Turning to the category of bottom-up mechanistic experiments, we can point to sev-
eral well-established experimental protocols. In behavioural pharmacological studies,
researchers typically seek to establish correlations between the effect of drugs that inhibit
LTP formation and the effect of these drugs on learning. An often cited study (Morris et
al. [1986]) investigated the effect of AP5, a drug that blocks the NMDA glutamate re-
ceptor, on LTP and learning abilities. Doses of AP5 that blocked LTP induction in vitro
and in vivo also seemed to impair learning of a spatial water maze task (Morris [1989]).
However, additional experimentation could not validate the inference from this stable
correlation to the necessity of LTP for memory formation. Subsequent studies showed
that if the rats are pretrained in a spatial task in the water maze without drug application
and then trained in a spatial task in another room, AP5 does not block learning even
though it blocks the induction of LTP (Bannerman [1995]). A similar study showed that
non-spatial pretraining in the water maze is sufficient to prevent the amnesic effect of
NMDA antagonists in a subsequent water maze task (Saucier and Cain [1995]). These
studies might be interpreted as showing that the drug induces motor impairments that
the animal has to cope with before being able to learn the task. Therefore, the correla-
tions established via this experimental methodology cannot be seen as providing direct
evidence for LTP-like effects during learning. The direct inference is blocked by the fact
that disturbing LTP and blocking learning with the same drug does not necessarily mean
that both effects are based on the same mechanism.
Still one might argue that these bottom-up experiments support a different kind of
inference which pertains to the dependence relation obtaining between LTP and learning.
If appropriate experiments could show that animals learn while LTP induction in the
hippocampus is blocked by a drug like AP5, then they would provide direct evidence for
the hypothesis that the LTP mechanism is not necessary for learning. Otherwise put,
in line with the abductive account, such experiments would establish that there is no
common-cause coupling between macroscopic LTP and learning. However, they would
not suffice to infer that the NMDA glutamate receptor (the target of the AP5 drug) is
not constitutively relevant for the LTP response. Or that a different LTP mechanism is
not inextricably coupled to learning phenomena. More systematic experimentation would
be required to conclude that there are good empirical grounds for ruling out either the
constitutive relevance of NMDA from a LTP mechanism or the constitutive dependence
between LTP and learning. Even in that case, the evidential support would be at best
indirect. That is, the results of behavioural pharmacological studies seem to be in line
with the predictions of the abductive account in the sense that they underdetermine both
types of constitutive inferences.
Another type of bottom-up experiment involves the saturation of all synapses in
the hippocampus by electrical stimulation. If LTP is the mechanism supporting the
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macrolevel behavioural phenomenon, then this experimental intervention would trigger
the upregulation of all synapses which in turn should make learning impossible. Some
of the first studies using this experimental methodology seemed to confirm this hypoth-
esis, showing that after saturation of synapses animals were not able to learn a spatial
task normally, while learning in animals in which LTP was induced but allowed to decay
was not impaired (Castro et al. [1989]). While these initial experiments were taken to
provide evidence in support of the stability of the correlation between LTP and learning,
follow-up studies reported the opposite result: animals that showed more LTP after HFS
learned the task even better (Jeffery and Morris [1993]). These latter results led to further
refinements of the experimental procedure in order to make sure that synaptic saturation
was indeed achieved, but the forthcoming results failed again to be conclusive (Holscher
[2001]). In other words, these bottom-up experiments could not support constitutive
inferences. On the contrary, as they seem to break the common cause coupling, they
provide preliminary evidence for the constitutive irrelevance of LTP in learning tasks.
A different experimental methodology has been developed to check whether LTP can
be elicited in the hippocampus at all. Experiments with gene deletion (knock-out) or
transgenic mice strains use mutant mice strains that do not express a defined gene for a
protein that has been previously shown to be crucial for LTP induction to compare their
ability to learn spatial or non-spatial tasks. As in the case of behavioural pharmacological
studies, the inferences drawn from these experimental methods are not conclusive. Even
when such bottom-up experiments can establish a stable correlation between learning
impairments and reduced or blocked LTP formation, they fall short of providing direct
evidence that the same mechanism underlies both the blocking of LTP and learning
impairments. Knocking out a gene that is essential for neuronal activity might impair
LTP without also being involved in learning impairments. That is, the evidence that
these experiments makes available underdetermines the choice between LTP and non-
LTP mechanistic models of learning. Moreover, while several experiments on mutant
mice strains that don’t express particular genes showed strong correlations between LTP
development and learning impairments, others failed to replicate the result and showed
that mice in which LTP was not inducible were still able to learn a spatial task in the
water maze (Malenka et al. [1989]; Grant et al. [1992]; Huang et al.[1995]).
In the attempt to improve existing types of bottom-up experimental studies, neuro-
scientists worked with experimental systems which involved selective knock-outs (of the
expression of NMDA receptors) in a limited brain area (CA1) of transgenic mice. These
surgical knock-out techniques were meant to avoid unwanted indirect effects caused by
lack of NMDA receptors in other parts of the brain or by other developmental impair-
ments in the brain. The experimental studies reported that mice were indeed impaired
in learning spatial tasks and that LTP of field EPSPs could not be induced in these
animals (Wilson and Tonegawa [1997]). These studies provide some of the most stable
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correlations between learning abilities in animals and LTP inducibility. However, they do
not yet establish the constitutive relevance of LTP for macrolevel phenomena of learn-
ing and memory. Neuroscientists continue to explore possible ways in which the cellular
and molecular levels could be experimentally manipulated to bring about behaviourally
observational effects. These efforts could be interpreted along the lines of the abductive
account. If LTP is constitutively relevant for memory formation or learning, then new
experimental manipulations should consistently fail to decouple the two levels. Revisions
of the hypothesis concerning the involvement of LTP in memory and learning processes,
on the other hand, will follow from experiments which would succeed in breaking the
common cause coupling of the two levels.
5.2 A comparative summary
The examples reviewed above illustrate the methodology of interlevel mechanistic experi-
ments in virtue of the fact that they explore the link between the macrolevel behavioural
phenomena of memory formation or learning and microlevel LTP phenomenon. We claim
that the abductive account provides a plausible reconstruction of the main trends in this
area of neurobiological research. On the one hand, the view provides an interpretation
for the rising skepticism against the LTP-based hypothesis of memory. Interlevel experi-
ments that succeed to break the common cause coupling between the two levels support
the idea that LTP might not be constitutively relevant for memory or for learning. On
the other hand, the view also makes sense of the call for more experimentation that would
make constitutive inferences (or the inferences about the constitutive irrelevance of LTP
mechanisms to memory) more robust.
In addition, the abductive account sharpens the methodological distinction between
interlevel constitutive experiments and causal experiments by highlighting the special
type of underdetermination problems facing constitutive inferences. According to Baum-
gartner and Casini [2017], the evidence produced by interlevel experiments cannot em-
pirically distinguish between a pure common cause model and a constitutive model of
the relationship between LTP and memory. The choice between the two types of models
is underdetermined by anything that falls short of a complete exploration of the whole
space of possible ways of breaking the coupling between the two levels. However, the
correlations revealed by interlevel experiments can be taken to support indirectly a con-
stitutive model. While the pure common cause model does not provide any insight into
why interlevel correlations cannot be broken, the constitutive model postulates that this
sort of stability stems from a particular type of dependence that obtains between the
two mechanistic levels under investigation. In other words, failure to de-couple the levels
counts indirectly as evidence for a constitutive dependence relation linking them. Thus,
inferring abductively a constitutive dependence relation is the only way of blocking the
22
underdetermination problem for constitutive inferences.
The latter consequence gives the abductive account one important advantage over
Craver’s own reconstruction of constitutive experiments in neuroscience (Craver [2002],
[2007a], [2007b]). Although the MM account can accommodate the call for more interlevel
experimentation in terms of neuroscientists’ concern for the robustness of their experi-
mental results, the abductive view does a better job at capturing the differences between
how scientists seem to treat interlevel or constitutive inferences and causal inferences.
More specifically, the latter account traces the hesitancy to fully endorse constitutive
models linking LTP and memory to the special type of underdetermination problem
facing constitutive models in general. In contrast, causal models of the molecular mecha-
nisms of LTP itself are more fully endorsed by the neuroscientific community even when
underdetermination problems are still to be encountered (cf. Sanes and Lichtman [1999];
Granger and Nicoll [2014])
In relation to this point, it is worth noting that for the aim of promoting LTP and
memory experimental research as being one of the best case studies for illustrating the
methodology of interlevel experiments and its links to constitutive reasoning in the biolog-
ical sciences, Craver focuses too much too often on causal relevance experiments instead.
In fact, his analysis targets frequently the description of the causal aspects of the mi-
croscopic LTP mechanism (Craver [2002], [2007b]; Craver and Darden [2013]; see also
Fagan [2015]). The conclusive character of the inferences concerning the causal relevance
of different mechanistic components of the LTP mechanism is however not transferable
to inferences about the relation between the microlevel of the LTP mechanism and the
macrolevel of memory and learning behaviours. Indeed Craver shies away from claiming
that scientists have developed any crucial experiment to establish that LTP is a con-
stitutively relevant component of memory mechanisms. Instead he seems to take the
practical limitations of interlevel experiments to block such a definitive conclusion. Al-
though descriptively accurate with respect to the current experimental landscape of LTP
and memory research, this stance is also at odds with the implication of the MM approach
that constitutive relations between higher and lower-level mechanistic levels can be es-
tablished conclusively on the basis of the cumulative evidence of pairs of top-down and
bottom-up experiments. We thus propose that Craver’s approach is less convincing than
the abductive account according to which the evidence yielded by interlevel experiments
will always underdetermine constitutive inferences.
The abductive account is not the only attempt to improve the philosophical analysis
of constitutive experimentation and reasoning in science. For instance, Harbecke [2015b]
articulates a regularity theory of constitution and constitutive inference, while Gebharter
[2017] proposes a modified version of a causal search algorithm for detecting constitutive
relations that are formally similar (under certain conditions) to direct causal relations.
The abductive account shares with Harbecke [2015b] the insight concerning the induc-
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tive risks implied by constitutive inferences. Although the abductive account offers a
more coarse grained assessment of the structure of interlevel experiments in neuroscience
than the one entailed by Harbecke’s set of inference rules, it also avoids the problems
confronting regularity views of causation more generally. Gebharter’s [2017] account on
the other hand does not rely either on strict regularities nor on interventions to analyze
constitutive inferences. In order to establish whether such an account entails a more
informative reconstruction of neurobiological interlevel experiments, one must show that
the dependence relations they target satisfy the formal conditions of the causal search
algorithm used to model constitutive inferences. It will be interesting to show in future
research which of the three accounts provides more accurate analyses and predictions
about the experimental practices of neurobiology. The aim of this paper was to show
that the abductive account provides a plausible reconstruction of interlevel experiments
and constitutive reasoning in at least one important area of neurobiological research.
6 Conclusions
On the abductive theory of constitution, interlevel mechanistic experiments support con-
stitutive inferences and explanations only by providing indirect evidence about consti-
tutive relevance relations. Interlevel experiments fail to de-couple the common causes
for the mechanistic macro and micro-levels. Positing a non-causal dependence relation
between the macrolevel and the microlevel, that is a constitutive relevance relation, aids
in explaining this systematic de-coupling failure. Thus, constitutional models which pos-
tulate such dependence relations are explanatorily superior to pure common cause models
which can be built on the back of the same types of interlevel experiments. In other words,
interlevel experiments cannot provide direct evidence that would distinguish empirically
a pure common cause model from a constitutive model of a mechanistic phenomenon.
However, a large class of interlevel experiments (top-down, bottom-up and mixed experi-
ments) yields indirect evidence that supports the explanatory value of constitutive models
in neuroscience. This characterization clearly distinguishes constitutive (relevance) in-
ferences from causal (relevance) inferences. In the case of the latter, it is possible (at
least in principle) to devise an experiment that would undercut the underdetermination
of the causal inference, whereas constitutive inferences suffer from a more radical form
of underdetermination. This is due to the fact that it is practically unfeasible to explore
the whole space of logically possible interlevel experiments.
So, instead of claiming, with Craver, that pairs of top-down and bottom-up mechanis-
tic experiments can conclusively establish mechanistic constitution relations, Baumgart-
ner and Casini’s recommendation is to view the evidence provided by these experiments
as offering indirect or abductive support for a constitutive claim linking different mech-
anistic levels. In the last section, we argued that this recommendation is in line with
24
the experimental methodologies observed in at least one important area of neuroscientific
research.
The abductive view of constitutive experiments has also two broader implications for
the philosophy of experimentation (Weber [2014]; Franklin and Perovic [2016]). The first
one concerns the types of evidence that mechanistic experiments can be said to provide in
support of different research hypotheses. The abductive account highlights the fact that
not all experiments yield direct evidence for a particular hypothesis or model under in-
vestigation. The fact that some inferences are bound to be underdetermined by the data
generated through some types of experiments does not make the latter useless. Rather,
according to the abductive account, these experiments generate indirect evidence for cer-
tain types of scientific inferences. Secondly, the abductive account suggests that similar
types of experiments (causal and constitutive relevance experiments) can be used to sup-
port and refine different types of scientific inferences. This calls for further investigations
into the different inferential roles of experiments in scientific investigation.
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